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This paper uses a recent increase in the state of Wisconsin’s tobacco tax as a natural experiment 
to measure the economic incidence of tobacco taxation.  We estimate the economic incidence of 
tobacco taxation using micro level data on cigarette prices collected from retail locations in 
Wisconsin and states that share its border.  We find that Wisconsin’s $1.00 increase in tobacco 
tax was over-shifted to consumers; they pay the entire amount of the tax as well as a premium of 
between $0.08 and $0.17 per pack of cigarettes.  We use geo-coded data to test if the incidence 
of the tobacco tax in Wisconsin is different for retail locations near another state’s border (where 
taxation is different).  We find that retail locations near another state’s border still pass along the 
entire amount of the tax to consumers, but the premium charged over the amount of the tax is 
reduced by between 13 and 54 percent depending on the distance in question and the 





The federal government collected over $7.7 billion in revenue from tobacco taxes in 2006 
(U.S. Treasury, 2007).  In addition to federal collections every state collects a tobacco tax, with 
the most recent tabulation showing that state governments as a whole collect $15.2 Billion 
annually in tobacco taxes (U.S. Census, 2008).1  Texas collects the largest dollar amount of 
tobacco taxes at over $1.3 Billion, while North Dakota collects the smallest at just over $24 
million annually (U.S. Census, 2008).  On average tobacco taxes represent about 2.25 percent of 
state revenues, and range from a high of 6.4 percent of revenues in New Hampshire to a low of 
less than one half of one percent of revenues in South Carolina (U.S. Census, 2008). 
Tobacco taxation is an important revenue source in every state and at the federal level, and is 
also intended as a policy to reduce tobacco consumption.2  A key component to understanding 
how effective a tobacco tax is at reducing consumption is how the economic incidence of the tax 
is split between consumers and producers.  If the full burden of a tobacco tax is passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices it is more likely to discourage consumption.  The 
incidence of tobacco taxation is also important for policy makers concerned with the fairness 
aspect of how revenues are raised.  Tobacco taxation is typically considered to be a regressive 
tax because tobacco users tend to be low income individuals.3  The actual burden of a tobacco 
tax on low income individuals will ultimately depend on how much (if any) of the tax is passed 
on to consumers.    
                                                 
1 This figure does not include additional sales taxes collected on tobacco. 
2 The economic justification for government intervention in the market for tobacco products is that tobacco use 
(especially smoking tobacco) causes a negative externality.  For studies that measure the external effects of tobacco 
use see Shoven et al. (1989), Manning et al. (1989, 1991), Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994), Viscusi (1995, 2002), 
Evans et al. (1999), Cutler et al. (2000), and Sloan et al. (2004).  For studies that measure the mortality cost per pack 
see Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Cutler (2002), Sloan et al. (2004), and Viscusi and Hersch (2008).  There have been 
a wide variety of studies that analyze demand for cigarettes, notably Becker et al. (1994), Evans et al. (1999), and 
Gruber and Koszegi (2001).  See Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for a comprehensive review of studies on cigarette 
demand. 
3 See Poterba (1989), Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), and Gravelle (2007) for a review of this literature. 
Previous studies that estimate the incidence of tobacco and cigarette taxation find a wide 
range of answers.  The results of these studies range from finding that the tax burden is over-
shifted to consumers (they pay the full tax plus a premium on top of the tax amount) to 
concluding that tobacco taxes do not raise prices by the amount of the tax.  Harris (1987) and 
Keeler et. al. (1996) both provide evidence using state level data that shows the burden of 
tobacco taxation is over-shifted to consumers, although their estimates on the size of over-
shifting differ dramatically.  Sumner and Wohlgenant (1985) estimate that only the amount of 
the tax is passed on to consumers, while Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) suggest that excise tax 
increases do not consistently act to increase retail prices.4   
We determine how the economic burden of a tobacco tax is divided between retail suppliers 
of cigarettes and consumers by estimating the retail price response to a recent $1.00 change in 
Wisconsin’s state cigarette tax.  Our study is unique from previous estimates of tobacco tax 
incidence in several ways.  First, our price data come from a unique survey of retail 
establishments that sell cigarettes; we have data from over 1,000 locations at the store level.  Our 
micro-level data allow flexibility in our estimation strategy including the opportunity to test the 
incidence of generic and name brand tobacco products separately, and also provide the 
opportunity to test the validity of many of our primary identification assumptions.  We are also 
able to differentiate between the response of different types of retail establishments including 
tobacco specialty stores, grocers, and convenience stores.  In addition, our data are geo-coded so 
we are able to test the price responsiveness of retailers that are near a bordering state where tax 
treatment is different. 
                                                 
4 Estimates on the incidence of general sales taxes find that the amount of tax burden passed on to consumers varies 
substantially across the type of product used to create the estimates, although many estimates show evidence of 
substantial over-shifting (see Besley and Rosen, 1999 and Poterba, 1996). 
We find that the $1.00 tax increase results in a statistically significant retail price increase of 
between $1.08 and $1.17 depending on the econometric specification we use, the type of 
cigarettes, and the type of retail establishment.  We find consistent evidence of over-shifting 
across both panel and repeated cross section econometric specifications, and for both name brand 
and generic cigarettes.  We also show that the amount of over-shifting is sensitive to how far the 
retail establishment is from the Wisconsin border, and that stores near the border lose about 
between 13 and 54 percent of the over-shifting premium enjoyed by stores further from the 
border, although this result is statistically quite imprecise.   
The remainder of the paper begins by giving the details behind Wisconsin’s tobacco tax 
change, and lays out our identification strategy for estimating the incidence of tobacco taxation.  
We follow with a description of our unique micro-level data on cigarette prices at retail 
establishments.  The third section of the paper presents and discusses our regression results for 
estimating the incidence of tobacco taxation; it also includes a discussion of potential criticisms 
of our methodology.   The final section of the paper concludes.     
 
Policy Change Background and Identification Strategy 
 
We use a recent increase in the tax on cigarettes in the state of Wisconsin as a natural 
experiment to identify the incidence of tobacco taxation.  Beginning January 1, 2008 Wisconsin 
increased the state tax on cigarettes by $1.00, from $0.77 to $1.77 per pack.5  While the cigarette 
tax increased by over 125 percent in Wisconsin with the start of the New Year6, the states that 
                                                 
5 WI Act 20, amend sec. 139.31(1) (a) and (b), signed into law on October 26, 2007. 
6 We expect an immediate response in the retail price of cigarettes on January 1, 2008 because of the way the new 
tax is collected.  According to conversations with administrators at the Wisconsin Department of Revenue the 
Wisconsin tobacco tax increase was also levied on inventories of cigarettes at the retail level on January 1, 2008.  
Store owners were required to pay the new tax on all cigarettes in inventory as of January 1, 2008.  Although this 
raises some concerns about the price response of retailers prior to the tax change, it means that we expect an 
immediate price response when the tax is enacted.   
 
share a border with Wisconsin did not change the tax treatment of cigarettes at that time.  Table 1 
shows the tax on cigarettes in Wisconsin and surrounding states before and after the tax increase 
took effect.  As shown in Table 1, Wisconsin went from having the lowest tax on cigarettes to 
having the second highest in the group of states that share its border.   
We use the differential change in Wisconsin and absence of change in states that share its 
border to identify how the tax affects the retail tax inclusive price, and thus measure the 
incidence of the tax.7  The policy change we use is a substantial tax increase compared to other 
recent tobacco tax changes.  Since January 1, 2000 there have been 83 separate state level 
cigarette tax increases,8 with a median increase of $0.39 per pack.  Wisconsin’s $1.00 increase 
matches the largest one time tobacco tax increase by any state since 2000, as shown in Table 2.9   
Our primary method used to identify the retail price response to the tax change is difference-
in-differences (D-D).  We compare the difference in the retail price of cigarettes in Wisconsin 
with surrounding states before the tax change (December, 2007) with the difference in prices 
between Wisconsin and surrounding states after the tax change (January, 2008).  The main 
advantage of using this method is that it controls for any fixed characteristics about Wisconsin as 
well as any time trends that affect all states that may also change cigarette prices.    
Using the D-D method requires two primary assumptions.  The first is that there are no 
factors other than the tax increase that affect the change in cigarette prices between December 
2007 and January 2008 in Wisconsin.  This assumption seems particularly reasonable given that 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin has a “minimum mark up” law on the retail sale of cigarettes.  This law, [s. 100.30, Stats.], requires 
retail cigarette venders to sell cigarettes for at least 6 percent more than the cost of buying them from a wholesaler or 
manufacturer.  Because of this law, retailers would require a cost adjustment from wholesalers to legally adjust their 
prices by less than the amount of the tax increase.  
8 Oregon is the only state to decrease the tobacco tax during this time period, doing so by $0.10 at the beginning of 
2004.   
Source:  http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cig_inc02.html 
9 Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Montana, South Dakota, and Texas also increased the tax per pack of cigarettes by $1 
since 2000. 
the time elapsed between our surveys is at most 42 days.  The second assumption is that prices in 
our control states (IA, IL, MI, and MN) are not affected by the policy change in Wisconsin.  Our 
data show that this assumption is not violated on average, as the price change in our control 
states is less than $0.01 for our full sample. 
We implement the D-D identification strategy using both data from a panel and repeated 
cross section of stores.  The regression used to determine the effect of the tax increase using the 
panel data is as follows: 
(1) (Pi,jan – Pi,dec) = α + β1(Wisconsin) + εi 
Where “Wisconsin” is a dummy variable equal to one if the store is located in that state, and 
P is the tax inclusive price of cigarettes for store i in either January or December.  Using a panel 
of stores and the change in price as our dependent variable means that we control for any 
attributes of the store that remain constant between December, 2007 and January, 2008 such as 
the type of retail establishment (for example whether the store is a convenience or grocery store), 
and it’s location.  Because we have information about the type of retail establishment we run 
regressions for Equation (1) using our entire panel as well as separate regressions for various 
types of establishments, and for stores that are within a short distance of the state border.   
The parameter of interest in Equation (1) is β1, which shows how the $1 tax increase in 
Wisconsin effects the change in cigarette prices.  If β1 < 1, this implies that the full burden of the 
tax is not passed on to consumers, some of the tax burden falls on cigarette retailers.  If β1 = 1, 
then the burden of the cigarette tax increase is fully realized by consumers in the form of higher 
prices.  If β1 > 1, this would be evidence that the tax on cigarettes is “over-shifted” to consumers, 
they bear the entire burden of the tax and pay a premium above the tax amount.  If the tax is 
over-shifted to consumers it is likely that the retail market for cigarettes is imperfect (see 
Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002 for a detailed discussion on the theoretical models of tax incidence 
that produce over-shifting).   
We also implement the D-D identification strategy using a repeated cross section of stores in 
our data.  This strategy allows us to use all stores for which we have price data on in at least one 
time period (December or January).  The regression used to determine the effect of the tax 
increase using the repeated cross section of stores is as follows: 
(2)  Pi,t = α + β1(Wisconsin) + β2(January)  + β3(Wisconsin*January) + Zi′γ + εi 
Where, as in the panel regression, “Wisconsin” is a dummy variable equal to one if the store is 
located in that state.  For cross-section identification, P is the tax inclusive price from store i in 
time period t, where t is either December, 2007 or January, 2008.  “January” is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation is from the period after the tax increase.  Z is a vector of control 
variables that includes a dummy variable indicating whether the store is a national retailer, a 
dummy variable indicating if the store is a tobacco only retailer, a convenience store, or grocery 
a store, and the distance to the state border (depending on the specification used).  Z also 
includes a dummy variable for the state level location of the store.  The coefficient of interest in 




Our data come from telephone surveys of cigarette retailers at tobacco specialty, grocery, and 
convenience stores in Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and the upper peninsula of 
Michigan.  We created a list of 1,542 stores that sell cigarettes in these states using phone book 
listings and internet searches by geography.10  We contacted each establishment in December, 
                                                 
10 We created the majority of our store list using an internet search engine and searching “tobacco store” and 
“convenience store” by geography for each state in our sample.  This search provided the store name, phone number, 
and address for the stores in our sample. 
2007 (before the tax increase) and again in January, 2008 (after the tax increase) to request the 
retail price of cigarettes. 
We implemented the first phase of surveys between December 17, 2007 and December 23, 
2007.  In the pre-tax change wave, 70 percent of stores provided price information, for a total of 
1072 data points.11  We implemented the second phase of surveys between January 9, 2008 and 
January 28, 2008.  A total of 1107 stores provided cigarette price information in the post-tax 
change phase, a 72 percent response rate.12  We create our panel using the 65 percent of stores on 
our list (1002 stores) that provided price information in both the pre-tax change and post-tax 
change phases. 
We requested price information on two types of cigarettes from the stores in our survey; a 
premium brand and generic brand.13  Our survey consisted of the following questions: 
• “What is the price per pack of Name Brand Cigarettes?” 
• “Does that price of Name Brand cigarettes include the sales and tobacco tax?” 
• “What is the price per pack of Generic Brand Cigarettes?” 
• “Does that price of Generic Brand cigarettes include the sales and tobacco tax?” 
A total of 614 (57 percent) out of the 1072 stores that gave price information for the name 
brand cigarettes in the first phase also gave price information for the generic brand cigarettes.   In 
the second phase, 641 (58 percent) out of the 1107 stores that gave price information on the 
name brand also gave price information on the generic brand.  
                                                 
11 470 stores did not give price information in the first wave of surveys.   Of these, 68 did not sell cigarettes, 82 
were either a wrong phone number or a disconnected line, 134 refused to give cigarette price information over the 
phone, 163 did not answer our calls, and the remaining 23 were not used because of reliability concerns. 
12 435 stores did not give price information in the second wave of surveys.   Of these, 40 did not sell cigarettes, 94 
were either a wrong number or a disconnected line, 115 refused to give cigarette price information over the phone, 
137 did not answer our calls, and the remaining 49 were not used because of reliability concerns. 
13 To keep consistent across locations we asked for the same name and generic brand from each store surveyed. 
We merged information on state, county, and city sales taxes, gathered from each state’s 
department of revenue,14 with our price data to calculate the tax-inclusive price for each 
observation.  The sales tax rates used to calculate the tax-inclusive price are listed in the 
appendix by city.  Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa have different sales tax rates across cities, while 
cities in the upper peninsula of Michigan all have a 6 percent sales tax rate.  In addition to the 
state of Illinois tobacco taxes, Cook County, IL has an additional $2.00 tax per pack, and the city 
of Chicago has an additional $0.68 tax per pack.  We contacted each state department of revenue 
(as well as city and county where appropriate) to ensure that there were no other changes, 
besides the $1 per pack increase in Wisconsin, made to sales or cigarette taxes between 
December 17, 2007 and January 28, 2008 for the cities in our sample.     
Our survey covers 270 cities, 106 (39 percent) are located in Wisconsin, 43 (16 percent) in 
Minnesota, 30 (11 percent) in the upper peninsula of Michigan, 65 (24 percent) in Illinois, and 
26 (10 percent) are located in Iowa.  Of the 1002 stores used to create our panel data, 423 (42 
percent) are located in Wisconsin, 186 (19 percent) are located in Minnesota, 60 (6 percent) are 
located in Michigan, 221 (22 percent) are located in Illinois, and 112 (11 percent) are located in 
Iowa. 
We classified the stores in our data by retail establishment type based on the store name.  We 
classified stores as tobacco specialty, grocery, or convenience stores.  We were also able to 
differentiate those that were national chain stores from local or regional establishments.  Out of 
the 1002 stores in our panel data, 101 (10 percent) are tobacco specialty stores, 148 (15 percent) 
                                                 




are grocery stores, and the remaining 753 (75 percent) are convenience stores.  About 40 percent 
(406 stores) are national chain retailers. 
In addition to information about the type of retail establishment, we also have the street 
address for each store in our sample.  We use GIS software to calculate the distance from the 
Wisconsin border for each store in our sample.  Of the stores in our sample we were able to 
locate 941 (94 percent) of the addresses exactly.  For the remaining 6 percent of stores that we 
could not match exactly, we use the center of the city or county where the store is located in to 
measure the distance to the nearest Wisconsin border.  In our data, 194 (19 percent of our panel) 
are stores located within 5 miles of the Wisconsin border.  Of the stores located within 5 miles of 
the Wisconsin border, 84 (43 percent) are in Wisconsin, 42 (22 percent) are in Minnesota, 30 (15 
percent) are in Illinois, 20 (10 percent) are in Michigan, and 18 (9 percent) are located in Iowa.  
The average distance to the nearest border state for stores located in Wisconsin in our sample is 
36 miles, with a standard deviation of 28 miles.  The average distance to the border for stores 
located in states surrounding Wisconsin is 63 miles, with a standard deviation of 70 miles. 
Table 3 (name brand) and 4 (generic) provide a summary of our price data across several 
dimensions.  The average price of name brand cigarettes in the pre-tax change survey is $4.36.  
In the post tax-change survey the average price of name brand cigarettes increased by almost 
$0.50 to $4.85.  Important for our identification strategy, the average price for name brand 
cigarettes in our control states (IL, MN, MI, IA) did not change by more than $0.06 (MI).  The 
average price of generic brand cigarettes in the pre-tax change survey is $3.83.  In the post tax-
change survey the average price of generic brand cigarettes increased by $0.46 to $4.29.  The 
average price of the generic brand cigarettes changed fairly substantially in two of our control 
states, which violates one of our identification assumptions for difference-in-difference 
estimation.  The average price of the generic brand cigarettes increased by $0.14 in Illinois, and 
by $0.10 in Michigan.  The standard deviation of price for the generic brand is also the largest in 
Illinois and Michigan at over $0.60 per pack.  
Table 3 (name brand) and 4 (generic) also show how our price data differs for stores that are 
within 5 miles of the Wisconsin state border.  As table 3 shows, the average price of name brand 
cigarettes in all states except Minnesota for stores within 5 miles of the Wisconsin border is less 
than the price at other stores in the state.  The discount for stores near the border is largest in 
Illinois, where stores within 5 miles of the Wisconsin border have an average price that is about 
$0.76 less than other stores in the state.  The border discount is also substantial in Michigan and 
Iowa, where stores within 5 miles of the Wisconsin border have an average price that is between 
$0.23 and $0.33 per pack less than other stores in those states.  A similar pattern does not emerge 
for the price of the generic brand cigarettes at stores located within 5 miles of the Wisconsin 
border.    
 
Estimates of Tobacco Tax Incidence 
 
Using our unique micro level data on the retail price of cigarettes in Wisconsin and 
surrounding states we can make several comparisons that allow us to identify the economic 
incidence of the tobacco tax increase.  Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the price 
changes that occur between December, 2007 (before the tax increase) and January, 2008 (after 
the tax increase) at the locations in our sample for both the generic and name brand cigarettes.  
Each dot in Figure 1 represents the price change of a retail location between December 2007 and 
January 2008.  As shown by the maps in Figure 1, prices in Wisconsin increased almost 
universally by more than the $1 tax for both the generic and name brand cigarettes.  Figure 1 also 
displays how well the Border States work as a control group, as most locations in other states did 
not change cigarette prices at all between December, 2007 and January, 2008. 
To get a precise estimate of the price response to the tax change exemplified by Figure 1, we 
estimate Equations (1) and (2) using data from our survey of cigarette retailers.  Regression 
results using the panel data estimating Equation (1) show that not only do consumers pay the 
entire $1 per pack tax increase, but they pay between a $0.12 and $0.17 premium on top of the 
tax increase.  As shown in column one of Table 5, we estimate the coefficient of interest in 
Equation (1), β1, to be equal to about 1.12 for name brand cigarettes and about 1.17 for the 
generic brand using the full sample of retail locations.  Both of these results are precisely 
estimated, as they are statistically different from zero at less than the one-percent level.  The 95 
percent confidence interval for the estimates in column one also shows that the point estimates 
are significantly larger than $1, evidence that the tax increase caused a larger price increase than 
the amount of the tax. 
Columns 2-5 of Table 5 show regression results for various types of retail establishments in 
the panel data.  These results confirm the finding that the $1 tax per pack increase is more than 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, and that this result is not unique to the type 
of retail establishment.  The results for both the generic and name brand cigarettes sold at 
grocery and convenience stores, columns 4 and 5 of Table 5, show that β1 is less than $0.01 
different than the coefficient using the entire sample, indicating no unique response from these 
types of stores.  The estimates for β1 in the specification using data from stores that are tobacco 
specialty establishments is about $1.10 for the name brand and about $1.13 for the generic, 
roughly $0.03 to $0.04 less than the full sample estimates.  The tobacco specialty store estimates 
suggest that these stores do not include as large a premium above the tax as other stores, which 
implies that this type of retail store does not possess the same degree of market power that other 
types of stores in our survey do.    
Regression results estimating Equation (2), shown in columns one and two of table 6, using 
the cross-section data for name brand cigarettes reinforce the findings from the panel data 
estimates.  Column (1) shows the cross section results without using the indicator variables for 
the type of retail establishment, and column (2) shows the estimates controlling for the type of 
retail establishment.   The coefficient of interest in each case, β3, which is comparable to β1 in the 
panel regression, is within $0.01 of the panel estimates confirming over-shifting of the tobacco 
tax that we estimate in the panel regressions. The 95 percent confidence interval for each of these 
estimates is larger than the panel regressions; however our results are still significantly different 
from zero at the one percent level.  
Columns (3) and (4) of table 6 show the regression results for estimating Equation (2) using 
the cross section data for the generic brand cigarettes.  Column (3) shows the cross section 
results without controls, and column (4) shows the results controlling for the type of retail 
establishment.  The coefficient of interest, again β3, is quite a bit lower than the comparable β1 
from the panel regressions.  We estimate the price increase as a result of the tax change is 
approximately $1.09 for generic brand cigarettes using the repeated cross section data, roughly 
$0.08 less than the estimate using the panel data.  Again, these results are statistically significant 
at the one percent level, with the confidence interval indicating that 95 percent of the distribution 
is greater than $1.00.  Although the cross section results for the generic brand cigarettes suggest 
a smaller premium than the panel results they still show evidence of substantial over-shifting of 
the tax burden on to consumers. 
The difference in the coefficient estimate between the panel and repeated cross section for 
generic cigarettes is likely caused by the substantial decrease in the grocery store premium.  As 
the grocery store coefficient in column (4) of table 6 shows, grocery stores sell the generic brand 
cigarettes for about $0.05 less than other stores, however the panel estimates for grocery stores 
indicate that they actually raised their price more than other stores.  It seems that the grocery 
stores that responded to our survey both in January and December were more likely to have 
raised their price more for the generic brand cigarettes than those who only responded in one of 
the surveys.  The coefficient for tobacco only stores shows that stores specializing in tobacco 
products sell both name brand ($0.40) and generic ($0.26) for substantially less than the other 
types of stores surveyed. 
Our estimates of the incidence of tobacco taxation are that the $1.00 tax increase is over-
shifted to consumers by between $0.08 and $0.17 depending on the econometric specification 
and the type of cigarettes used in estimating.  Our estimates are similar in magnitude to Keeler 
et. al. (1996) that estimates a $1 increase in the tobacco tax would increase the price of cigarettes 
by $1.11.  This is encouraging, considering that Keeler et. al. use annual state level data (from 
1960 to 1990) and identifies the parameter of interest from a series of state tax changes.  Both the 
Keeler et. al. estimate and the estimates presented here are substantially smaller than the estimate 
by Harris (1987) that suggests a $1.00 increase in the cigarette tax would result in a retail price 
increase of over $2.00.   
The over-shifting of the tobacco tax on to consumers that we find in our estimates is 
consistent with an imperfect market for cigarettes.  An explanation for market imperfection is 
offered by Becker et. al. (1994).  Becker proposes that because cigarette companies work as an 
oligopoly, they obtain maximum profit by raising the price of their product on addicted smokers.  
The profit gained from increasing price on addicted smokers offsets the future losses from the 
reduced smoking by casual or new smokers that results from the price increase. 
  
Estimates of Tobacco Tax Incidence by Geography 
As noted in the background section and by table 1, Wisconsin shares a border with states that 
have a range of tobacco tax rates from $0.98 to $2.00.  Because of the possibility for casual 
smuggling15 in areas close to the border, demand elasticity may vary by proximity to the state 
border.  It is likely that cigarette demand is more inelastic for consumers that are further from a 
state border, as it is more costly (in terms of time and travel expense) to avoid the tax.  If demand 
for cigarettes near the border is more elastic, then the price increase from the tax change should 
be smaller at stores closer to the border of Wisconsin than at stores further from the border.16   
We can test for the possibility that the incidence of the tobacco tax varies across distance 
from the state border using our geo-coded data and altering our econometric specifications in 
Equation (1) and (2).  To test the effect that distance from the state border has on how the tax 
incidence is divided we group our data into stores that are within one, five, ten, and twenty-five 
miles of the state border.  We create an indicator variable equal to one for each of these 
groupings and run separate regressions using panel data with following econometric 
specification: 
(3) (Pi,jan – Pi,dec) = α + β1(Wisconsin) + β2 (Inside Mile) + β3 (Inside Mile*Wisconsin) + εi 
Where “Inside Mile” is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a store is within one, five, 
ten, or twenty-five miles of the state border depending on the specification.  The coefficient of 
interest is β3, which, if different from zero, tells us that stores within our distance boundaries 
                                                 
15 See Baltagi and Levin (1986), Gruber, et. al. (2003), Stehr (2005), and Lovenheim (2008) for studies on cross 
border cigarette smuggling. 
16 We assume that the supply curve for retail cigarettes has a constant elasticity across state geography. 
split the incidence of the tobacco tax differently with consumers than those further from the 
border.  Notice that the β2 coefficient in the panel specification is not a general distance premium 
as the dependent variable is the change in the price of cigarettes. We run separate regressions for 
each measure of distance; the results are presented in table 7 for the name brand cigarettes and 
table 8 for the generic brand.   
As column (1) of table 7 shows, cigarette retailers located within one mile of the Wisconsin 
border do not over-shift the amount of the tobacco tax by as much as those further from the 
border for name brand cigarettes.  The point estimate for the β3 coefficient in this specification 
suggests that retailers within one mile of the Wisconsin border over-shift by about $0.02 less 
than stores further from the border for name brand cigarettes.  The standard errors and 95 percent 
confidence interval show this estimate is quite imprecise, however, it does suggest that demand 
extremely close to a state border may be more elastic than demand further from the border.   
The results in columns (2), (3), and (4) of table 7 also offer suggestive evidence that the tax 
burden is not over-shifted by retail cigarette outlets near the border as much as it is further from 
the border for name brand cigarettes.  These specifications use an indicator variable for stores 
that are five, ten and twenty five miles from the border respectively.  As the β3 point estimate 
shows, stores close to the border lose about $0.02 of the premium they are able to charge on top 
of the tax increase at stores further from the border for name brand cigarettes.  Again, the 
standard errors in each of these specifications is too large to attach statistical significance to, 
however, they are smaller than those reported for the one mile specification.  The 95 percent 
confidence interval in each column shows the bulk of the distribution is negative, suggesting that 
stores near the border face a more elastic demand curve than stores further from the border. 
Using our panel data for generic brand cigarettes we find more suggestive evidence that 
retailers near the Wisconsin border are not able to over-shift the burden of the tax as much as 
retailers further from the border.  Table 8 presents estimation results for Equation (3) using our 
panel data for generic brand cigarettes.  These results suggest that the demand elasticity 
difference for generic brand cigarettes near the border is greater than the name brand cigarettes, 
as the β3 coefficient is as large as $0.05 for stores located within one mile of the Wisconsin 
border.  As with the name brand results, the standard errors are large, and we cannot attach 
statistical significance to these results, however the bulk of the 95 percent confidence interval is 
less than zero suggesting that indeed stores near the border are not able to over-shift the burden 
of the tax by as much as stores further from the border.    
To test the effect that distance has on the incidence of tobacco taxation using cross sectional 
data we use the following econometric specification: 
(4) Pi,t = α + β1(Wisconsin) + β2(January)  + β3(Wisconsin*January) + β4 (Inside Mile) + 
β5(Inside Mile*Wisconsin) + β6 (January*Inside Mile) + β7 (Wisconsin*January*Inside 
Mile) + Zi′γ + εi 
Where, as in Equation (2) the Zi represents store level characteristics and includes a set of 
state level dummy variables.  The interaction variables allow us to isolate the effect that distance 
has on the incidence of the tobacco tax in the β7 coefficient, it is the combined effect of the tax 
(being in Wisconsin and after the tax increase in January) and of being close to the border as 
measured in one, five, ten, and twenty-five mile groups.  The β4 coefficient for the cross section 
specification gives us an estimate of the general premium or discount that retail outlets near the 
Wisconsin border are subject to, which we could not obtain using the panel specification. As 
with the panel data, we run separate regressions for each measure of distance using the cross 
section data and Equation (4).  Table 9 and 10 show estimation results for Equation (4) using 
each measure of distance. 
As the β7 coefficient in column (1) of table 9 shows, cigarette retailers located within one 
mile of the Wisconsin border do not over-shift the amount of the tobacco tax by as much as those 
further from the border for name brand cigarettes.  The point estimate suggests a larger discount 
than the panel specification; however the standard errors for this specification are so large 
relative to the point estimate that precise comparison to the panel estimate is not appropriate.  
The β7 coefficient in the five, ten, and twenty five mile specifications also suggest that being 
close to the border affects how much of the tax burden is over-shifted to consumers.  The point 
estimates using our cross section data for name brand cigarettes are larger than the panel 
estimates, and suggest that the discount for being close to the border is between $0.01 and $0.07, 
or between 13 and 54 percent17 of the over-shifting premium; however we cannot attach 
statistical significance to these estimates. 
  Using our cross section data for generic brand cigarettes we find further suggestive 
evidence that retailers near the Wisconsin border are not able to over-shift the burden of the tax 
as much as retailers further from the border.  Table 10 presents estimation results for Equation 
(4) using our cross sectional data for generic brand cigarettes.  As with the panel, these results 
suggest that the demand elasticity difference for generic brand cigarettes near the border is 
greater than for the name brand cigarettes, as the β7 coefficient is as large as $0.13 for stores 
located within ten miles of the Wisconsin border.  The standard errors are also large in every 
specification, and we cannot attach statistical significance to these results. The bulk of the 95 
percent confidence interval, however, is less than zero suggesting that indeed stores near the 
                                                 
17 Percentage is based on the premium from our panel and cross section regressions without using distance in tables 
5 and 6, the distance premium is taken from the β7 coefficient in tables 7 and 9. 
border are not able to over-shift the burden of the tax by as much as stores further from the 
border. 
The coefficient on the “inside mile” variable (β4) in the cross sectional specification suggests 
that the retail price of cigarettes at stores a short distance from the Wisconsin border is 
significantly lower than the retail price at stores further from the border.  The point estimates for 
β4 suggest that the price of generic brand cigarettes near the Wisconsin border is between $0.04 
and $0.13 lower than the price at stores further from the border.  These estimates are statistically 
different from zero for the five, ten, and twenty five mile specifications.  The point estimates for 
the name brand regression reflect a larger border discount, between $0.35 and $0.49 (statistically 
different than zero) depending on the specification.  
On balance the results presented in tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 show that retailers near the 
Wisconsin border do not over-shift the burden of the tax increase by as much as stores located in 
the interior of the state.  This result is suggestive evidence that demand is more elastic near the 
border than it is further from the border.   
 
Methodology Concerns and Robustness Checks 
 
There are two main criticisms about our methodology for identifying the incidence of 
tobacco taxation that we have not yet addressed.  The first is that although we look at prices in 
Wisconsin before and after the tax change, we cannot rule out that there are other factors that are 
causing prices to change besides the tax increase.  The second is that retail cigarette outlets in 
Wisconsin may be changing the price of their product prior to the date of the tax increase in 
response to the looming law change and this response biases our estimates.   
The difference-in-difference identification strategy we use assumes that the price change that 
would have occurred in Wisconsin in the absence of the tax change is equal to the price change 
that actually occurred over the same time period in the Border States.  We believe that our 
assumption is reasonable considering that the average price change in Border States for the name 
brand cigarettes was less than $0.01 and generic brand cigarettes was $0.01.  This does not rule 
out that other factors in Wisconsin do not change during the period of our data, however.   
We are aware of one other minor law change in Wisconsin that may have also altered the 
price of cigarettes besides the tax.  Beginning January 1st, 2008, Wisconsin began offering a free 
two-week supply of tobacco cessation medication to anyone requesting it through a toll-free 
phone call.  The medication includes nicotine patches, gum and lozenges. 18    The offer is for a 
one time supply and ranges in value between $50 and $100 and lasts for approximately two 
months.  We believe that any potential bias in our estimates from this program would work 
toward lowering our estimated coefficients.  We are not aware of any other law change or trends 
that would affect our results. 
To examine how serious a concern altering prices in response to the expected tax change is, 
we administered a secondary survey of establishments in our sample to ask them about this 
possibility.  We randomly selected fifty stores in Wisconsin from our sample and asked them 
about the timing of their price changes as a result of the tax increase.  Specifically, we asked the 
establishment manager if they had changed prices on exactly January 1st, 2008.  49 out of the 50 
store managers surveyed stated that they had changed prices exactly on January 1st.  The lone 
exception stated that they had waited until about a week after January 1st to increase prices.  We 
also asked if they had changed cigarette prices prior to the January 1st tax policy change.  None 
of the 50 respondents in our survey stated that they changed prices in anticipation of the tax 
change.  Although the sample size is quite small, we believe that these survey results are 
                                                 
18 University of Wisconsin Center for Tobacco Research and Intervention “Quit Line.”  http://www.ctri.wisc.edu/.  
 
supportive evidence that our assumption that cigarette prices did not change in anticipation of the 




Tobacco taxes represent about $22 billion dollars annually in federal and state government 
revenues.  Although the statutory incidence of these taxes falls on tobacco sellers, the economic 
incidence is often assumed to fall largely on tobacco consumers.  The evidence we present here 
suggests that not only do consumers pay the entire economic burden of the tobacco tax, but that 
they also pay a premium in addition to the amount of tax. We find that the incidence of tobacco 
taxation is over-shifted to consumers by between 8 and 17 percent of the amount of the tax.    
The amount of over-shifting of the tobacco tax we find is similar to that found by Keeler et. al. 
(1996), although our data and methodology differ substantially. 
Our paper is unique in that we are able to estimate how sensitive the tax incidence is to the 
distance that a retail location is from the state border (where taxes are different).   We show that 
the amount of over-shifting is sensitive to how far the retail establishment is from a state border, 
as stores near the border lose between 13 and 54 percent of the over-shifting premium.  The loss 
in over-shifting premium is consistent with recent evidence presented by Lovenheim (2008) on 
casual cigarette smuggling across state borders.  The relationship between cigarette prices, 
smuggling, and distance to a state’s border suggests that policy makers may want to coordinate 
tax rates or tax rate increases with neighboring states if the goal is to reduce tobacco 
consumption. 
The premium paid on top of the tobacco tax is likely the result of the structure of the market 
for cigarettes, and is probably paid by addicted smokers to offset the profit lost from those who 
stop smoking (or never start) as suggested by Becker et. al. (1994).  Although our results are 
consistent with the model suggested by Becker et. al. we cannot directly test who among the 
population of smokers pays the tax using our data.  More research on the consumption response 
to tobacco tax changes is necessary to determine if it is long-term or addicted smokers who pay 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Name Brand Cigarettes (standard deviations in parenthesis)
   Wisconsin Illinois Minnesota Michigan  Iowa
All 
States
December 2007 Survey             
Average Price   $3.87 $4.92 $4.31 $5.16  $4.89 $4.36
Standard Deviation (Price)   (0.29) (1.49) (0.25) (0.35)  (0.42) (0.89)
Minimum Price   $3.41 $3.70 $3.97 $4.31  $4.19 $3.41
Maximum Price   $5.00 $8.93 $5.40 $6.10  $5.60 $8.93
N, Dec 07  466 232 197 60  117 1072
              
Average Distance to WI border (Miles)   35.84 76.08 38.69 33.09  88.38 50.65
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border 87 32 43 20  18 200
Average Border Store Price   $3.82 $4.26 $4.32 $4.96  $4.64 $4.18
Average Non‐Border Store Price   $3.88 $5.02 $4.30 $5.25  $4.94 $4.40
              
Average Convenience Store Price  $3.86 $5.01 $4.30 $5.14  $5.02 $4.36
Number of Convenience Stores  369 143 156 54  87 809
Average Grocery Store Price   $3.96 $5.30 $4.39 $5.32  $4.88 $4.51
Number of Grocery Stores   68 43 31 6  8 156
              
Average Tobacco Store Price   $3.81 $4.27 $4.18 NA  $4.39 $4.16
Number of Tobacco Stores  29 46 10 0  22 107
Average National Chain Store Price  $3.86 $5.30 $4.25 $4.98  $5.01 $4.38
Number of National Chain Stores   197 72 89 32  44 434
January 2008 Survey              
Average Price  $5.00 $4.88 $4.32 $5.22  $4.89 $4.85
   (0.33) (1.45) (0.29) (0.40)  (0.43) (0.79)
Minimum Price   $3.80 $3.72 $4.05 $4.23  $3.69 $3.69
Maximum Price   $6.63 $8.93 $5.40 $6.47  $5.55 $8.93
N,  Jan 08  464 246 208 64  125 1107
              
Average Distance to WI border (Miles)   35.62 80.14 38.17 34.25  88.64 51.90
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border  88 33 49 20  19 209
Average Border Store Price   $4.95 $4.24 $4.36 $4.99  $4.70 $4.68
Average Non‐Border Store Price   $5.01 $4.99 $4.30 $5.32  $4.93 $4.89
              
Average Convenience Store Price   $4.99 $4.98 $4.31 $5.21  $5.01 $4.87
Number of Convenience Stores  363 153 167 59  93 835
Average Grocery Store Price   $5.10 $5.21 $4.37 $5.35  $4.81 $4.98
Number of Grocery Stores   70 42 31 5  9 157
              
Average Tobacco Store Price   $4.89 $4.33 $4.24 NA  $4.42 $4.49
Number of Tobacco Stores   31 51 10 0  23 115
Average National Chain Store Price  $5.00 $5.31 $4.23 $5.01  $5.01 $4.89




   Wisconsin Illinois Minnesota Michigan  Iowa
All 
States
December 2007 Survey             
Average Price   $3.42 $3.79 $3.99 $4.51  $4.48 $3.83
   (0.32) (0.33) (0.20) (0.83)  (0.47) (0.52)
Minimum Price   $2.11 $2.66 $3.44 $3.18  $3.54 $2.11
Maximum Price  $4.91 $5.03 $4.70 $6.51  $5.35 $6.51
              
Average Distance to WI border (Miles)  32.02 95.28 39.27 30.02  88.51 53.75
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border 53 18 37 5  15 128
Average Border Store Price   $3.47 $3.82 $3.99 $3.78  $4.37 $3.78
Average Non‐Border Store Price   $3.41 $3.78 $4.00 $4.84  $4.50 $3.84
              
Average Convenience Store Price  $3.44 $3.82 $3.99 $4.51  $4.65 $3.86
Number of Convenience Stores  179 57 124 16  67 443
Average Grocery Store Price   $3.34 $3.75 $4.03 NA  $4.43 $3.73
Number of Grocery Stores   35 20 25 0  8 88
              
Average Tobacco Store Price  $3.43 $3.76 $3.87 NA  $3.98 $3.74
Number of Tobacco Stores  20 29 8 0  21 78
Average National Chain Store Price  $3.43 $3.75 $3.97 $4.46  $4.68 $3.84
Number of National Chain Stores  104 23 67 10  35 239
N,  Dec 07  234 106 157 16  96 609
January 2008 Survey             
Average Price   $4.58 $3.93 $4.03 $4.61  $4.50 $4.29
Standard Deviation (Price)   (0.30) (0.64) (0.22) (0.62)  (0.46) (0.50)
Minimum Price   $3.35 $3.25 $3.24 $3.60  $3.47 $3.24
Maximum Price  $5.90 $7.62 $4.82 $5.40  $5.23 $7.62
              
Average Distance to WI border (Miles)   31.49 105.95 40.06 56.73  90.18 59.20
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border 51 21 44 1  15 132
Average Border Store Price  $4.60 $3.88 $4.04 $3.60  $4.37 $4.26
Average Non‐Border Store Price  $4.57 $3.94 $4.03 $4.81  $4.52 $4.29
              
Average Convenience Store Price   $4.58 $4.05 $4.04 $4.61  $4.63 $4.35
Number of Convenience Stores   161 69 132 6  80 448
Average Grocery Store Price   $4.61 $3.96 $4.06 NA  $4.47 $4.26
Number of Grocery Stores   29 19 29 0  7 84
              
Average Tobacco Store Price  $4.48 $3.70 $3.91 NA  $4.03 $4.00
Number of Tobacco Stores   22 36 9 0  21 88
Average National Chain Store Price   $4.58 $3.98 $4.01 $4.37  $4.69 $4.36
Number of National Chain Stores  104 30 74 4  40 252





   Full Panel National Chain Tobacco  Convenience Grocery
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)
Wisconsin (β1)  1.1275*** 1.117*** 1.1023***  1.1316*** 1.1313***
   (0.0093) (0.0154) (0.0455)  (0.0102) (0.0217)
            
95% Confidence for β1  [1.1093 , 1.1458] [1.0868 , 1.1472] [1.0119 , 1.1926]  [1.1116 , 1.1516] [1.0884 , 1.1742]
            
N  1002 407 101  753 148
R2  0.9364 0.9287 0.8555  0.9423 0.949
Generic
Wisconsin (β1)  1.1763*** 1.2081*** 1.1363***  1.1805*** 1.1791***
   (0.0246) (0.0391) (0.0456)  (0.0309) (0.0578)
            
95% Confidence for β1  [1.1279 , 1.2247] [1.1308 , 1.2854] [1.0452 , 1.2274]  [1.1197 , 1.2412] [1.0637 , 1.2946]
            
N  474 184 71  338 65








   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wisconsin (β1)  ‐1.0230*** ‐1.0888*** ‐1.0367*** ‐1.0641***
   (0.0628) (0.0620) (0.0390) (0.0383)
            
January (β2)  ‐0.0044 ‐0.0023 0.0669** .0663**
   (0.0421) (0.0413) (0.0271) (0.0265)
            
Wisconsin*January 
(β3)  1.1362***  1.1345***  1.0892***  1.0943***
   (0.0644) (0.0632) (0.0450) (0.0439)
            
National Chain     0.0749**   ‐0.0058
      (0.0348)   (0.0240)
            
Tobacco Only Store      ‐0.4086***   ‐0.2623***
      (0.0552)   (0.0334)
            
Grocery Store     0.1642***   ‐0.0536
      (0.0484)   (0.0333)











            
N  2179 2179 1229 1229















   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Wisconsin (β1)  1.1262*** 1.1283*** 1.1301***  1.1306***
   (.0087) (.0094) (.0098)  (.0109)
Inside 1 Mile (β2)  ‐0.0083      
   (.0298)      
Inside 5 Miles (β2)    0.0135    
     (.0139)    
Inside 10 Miles (β2)      0.0141   
       (.0124)   
Inside 25 Miles (β2)        0.0000
         (.0109)
Wisconsin*Inside 1 Mile (β3)  ‐0.0205      
   (.0380)      
Wisconsin*Inside 5 Miles (β3)    ‐0.0216    
     (.0213)    
Wisconsin*Inside 10 Miles (β3)      ‐0.0229   
       (.0192)   
Wisconsin*Inside 25 Miles (β3)        ‐0.0172
         (.0172)
95% Confidence for (β3)  [‐.0950, .0540] [‐.0635, .0202] [‐.0606, .0148]  [‐.0510 .0167]
N  992 992 992  992












   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Wisconsin (β1)  1.144*** 1.1424*** 1.1521***  1.1570***
   (.0228) (.0254) (.0266)  (.0288)
Inside 1 Mile (β2)  ‐0.0069      
   (.0696)      
Inside 5 Miles (β2)    0.0071    
     (.0304)    
Inside 10 Miles (β2)      0.0388   
       (.0279)   
Inside 25 Miles (β2)        0.0297
         (.0247)
Wisconsin*Inside 1 Mile (β3)  ‐0.054      
   (.0876)      
Wisconsin*Inside 5 Miles (β3)    ‐0.0219    
     (.0492)    
Wisconsin*Inside 10 Miles (β3)      ‐0.0538   
       (.0462)   
Wisconsin*Inside 25 Miles (β3)        ‐0.0472
        (.0435)
95% Confidence for (β3)  [‐.2261, .1182] [‐.1187, .0748] [‐.1446, .0370]  [‐.1328, .0384]
N  460 460 460  460












   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Wisconsin*January (β3)   1.1440***  1.1495***  1.1518***   1.1581***
   (.0651) (.0699) (.0722)  (.0793)
Inside 1 Mile (β4)  ‐0.4154**  
   (.1625)  
Inside 5 Miles (β4)     ‐0.3538***  
     (.0760)  
Inside 10 Miles (β4)    ‐.4388***   





Wisconsin*January*Inside 5 Miles (β7)   ‐0.0506  
     (.1608)  
Wisconsin*January*Inside 10 Miles 
(β7)    ‐0.0429   













N  2170 2170 2170  2170


















   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Wisconsin*January (β3)   1.1001***  1.1163***  1.1439***   1.1422***
   (.0448) (.0492) (.0419)  (.0559)
Inside 1 Mile (β4)  ‐0.0423  
   ( .1074)  
Inside 5 Miles (β4)    ‐0.0940**  
     (.0472)  
Inside 10 Miles (β4)     ‐0.1303***   





Wisconsin*January*Inside 5 Miles (β7)   ‐0.0725  
     (.1045)  
Wisconsin*January*Inside 10 Miles 
(β7)    ‐0.1371   













N  1224 1224 1224  1224

































































































































































































































































































































































































































!( -$2.27 - -$0.01
! $0.00
! $0.01 - $1.00
! $1.01 - $2.15
 Price Change
!( -$1.26 - -$0.01
! $0.00
! $0.01 - $1.00
! $1.01 - $2.23
Figure I:  Cigarette Price Change, Dec. ‘07 to Jan. ‘08
Source:  Maps created using Arcmap GIS software, data from survey of cigarette retail establishments
Appendix: Sales Tax Rates by City 
 
Appendix Table 1:  Sales Tax Rates by City 
City  County State Sales Tax Rate 
Cedar Falls  Black Hawk IA 0.0700
Waterloo  Black Hawk IA 0.0700
Mason City  Cerro Gordo IA 0.0700
Alta Vista  Chickasaw IA 0.0700
Fredericksburg  Chickasaw IA 0.0700
Nashua  Chickasaw IA 0.0700
New Hampton  Chickasaw IA 0.0700
Garnavillo  Clayton IA 0.0700
Guttenberg  Clayton IA 0.0700
Dubuque  Dubuque IA 0.0700
Dyersville  Dubuque IA 0.0700
Farley  Dubuque IA 0.0700
New Vienna  Dubuque IA 0.0700
Peosta  Dubuque IA 0.0700
Worthington  Dubuque IA 0.0700
Waucoma  Fayette IA 0.0700
Coralville  Johnson IA 0.0600
Iowa City  Johnson IA 0.0600
Cedar Rapids  Linn IA 0.0600
Marshalltown  Marshall IA 0.0700
Des Moines  Polk IA 0.0600
Pleasant Hill  Polk IA 0.0600
Windsor Heights  Polk IA 0.0600
Bettendorf  Scott IA 0.0700
Davenport  Scott IA 0.0700
Ottumwa  Wapello IA 0.0700
Princeton  Bureau IL 0.0725
Champaign  Champaign IL 0.0775
Urbana  Champaign IL 0.0775
Chicago  Cook IL 0.0900
Dekalb  Dekalb IL 0.0750
Sycamore  Dekalb IL 0.0700
Clinton  Dewitt IL 0.0675
Aurora  DuPage IL 0.0775
Canton  Fulton IL 0.0725
Carbondale  Jackson IL 0.0775
De Soto  Jackson IL 0.0625
Murphysboro  Jackson IL 0.0725
East Dubuque  Jo Daviess IL 0.0675









City  County State Sales Tax Rate 
Stockton  Jo Daviess IL 0.0625
Warren  Jo Daviess IL 0.0625
Warren  Jo Daviess IL 0.0625
Aurora  Kane IL 0.0775
North Aurora  Kane IL 0.0700
Galesburg  Knox IL 0.0750
La Salle  La Salle IL 0.0700
Ottawa  La Salle IL 0.0700
Peru  La Salle IL 0.0700
Sheridan  La Salle IL 0.0650
Streator  La Salle IL 0.0750
Antioch  Lake IL 0.0650
Beach Park  Lake IL 0.0750
Fox Lake  Lake IL 0.0650
Grayslake  Lake IL 0.0650
Libertyville  Lake IL 0.0650
North Chicago  Lake IL 0.0650
Wadsworth  Lake IL 0.0650
Waukegan  Lake IL 0.0750
Winthrop Harbor  Lake IL 0.0650
Zion  Lake IL 0.0650
Decatur  Macon IL 0.0800
Mount Zion  Macon IL 0.0650
Mt Zion  Macon IL 0.0650
Macomb  McDonough IL 0.0725
Harvard  McHenry IL 0.0650
Johnsburg  McHenry IL 0.0650
Lakemoor  McHenry IL 0.0650
Mchenry  McHenry IL 0.0650
Richmond  McHenry IL 0.0650
Spring Grove  McHenry IL 0.0650
Waterloo  Monroe IL 0.0625
Davis  Ogle IL 0.0625
Bartonville  Peoria IL 0.0650
Peoria  Peoria IL 0.0800
West Peoria  Peoria IL 0.0800
Moline  Rock Island IL 0.0725
Chatham  Sangamon IL 0.0625
Springfield  Sangamon IL 0.0775









City  County State Sales Tax Rate 
Dakota  Stephenson IL 0.0675
Freeport  Stephenson IL 0.0725
Rock City  Stephenson IL 0.0675
Winslow  Stephenson IL 0.0675
Danville  Vermilion IL 0.0775
Cambria  Williamson IL 0.0625
Durand  Winnebago IL 0.0725
Machesney Park  Winnebago IL 0.0725
Rockford  Winnebago IL 0.0825
Rockton  Winnebago IL 0.0725
Roscoe  Winnebago IL 0.0725
South Beloit  Winnebago IL 0.0725
Vulcan  Alger MI 0.0600
Bark River  Delta MI 0.0600
Escanaba  Delta MI 0.0600
Garden  Delta MI 0.0600
Gladstone  Delta MI 0.0600
Rapid River  Delta MI 0.0600
Wells  Delta MI 0.0600
Iron Mountain  Dickinson MI 0.0600
Kingsford  Dickinson MI 0.0600
Norway  Dickinson MI 0.0600
Ironwood  Gogebic MI 0.0600
Wakefield  Gogebic MI 0.0600
Watersmeet  Gogebic MI 0.0600
Nisula  Houghton MI 0.0600
Toivola  Houghton MI 0.0600
Caspian  Iron MI 0.0600
Crystal Falls  Iron MI 0.0600
Iron River  Iron MI 0.0600
Mc Millan  Luce MI 0.0600
Newberry  Luce MI 0.0600
Engadine  Mackinac MI 0.0600
Carney  Menominee MI 0.0600
Menominee  Menominee MI 0.0600
Powers  Menominee MI 0.0600
Spalding  Menominee MI 0.0600
Stephenson  Menominee MI 0.0600
Ontonagon  Ontonagon MI 0.0600









City  County State Sales Tax Rate 
Cooks  Schoolcraft MI 0.0600
Seney  Schoolcraft MI 0.0600
Blaine  Anoka MN 0.0650
Columbia Heights  Anoka MN 0.0650
Coon Rapids  Anoka MN 0.0650
Detroit Lakes  Becker MN 0.0650
Bemidji  Beltrami MN 0.0650
Mankato  Blue Earth MN 0.0650
Center City  Chisago MN 0.0650
Shafer  Chisago MN 0.0650
Taylors Falls  Chisago MN 0.0650
Red Wing  Goodhue MN 0.0650
Brooklyn Center  Hennepin MN 0.0650
Brooklyn Park  Hennepin MN 0.0650
Edina  Hennepin MN 0.0650
Golden Valley  Hennepin MN 0.0650
Minneapolis  Hennepin MN 0.0650
Plymouth  Hennepin MN 0.0650
Richfield  Hennepin MN 0.0650
St Louis Park  Hennepin MN 0.0650
La Crescent  Houston MN 0.0650
Marshall  Lyon MN 0.0650
Austin  Mower MN 0.0650
North Mankato  Nicollet MN 0.0650
Rochester  Olmsted MN 0.0650
Fergus Falls  Otter Tail MN 0.0650
St Paul  Ramsey MN 0.0650
Babbitt  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Britt  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Cook  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Duluth  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Ely  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Eveleth  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Gilbert  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Hermantown  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Hibbing  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Hoyt Lakes  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Proctor  St. Louis MN 0.0650
Tower  St. Louis MN 0.0650









City  County State Sales Tax Rate
Lakeland  Washington MN 0.0650
Stillwater  Washington MN 0.0650
Woodbury  Washington MN 0.0650
Rollingstone  Winona MN 0.0650
Winona  Winona MN 0.0650
Almena  Barron WI 0.0550
Barron  Barron WI 0.0550
Barronett  Barron WI 0.0550
Belmont  Barron WI 0.0550
Chetek  Barron WI 0.0550
Dallas  Barron WI 0.0550
Mikana  Barron WI 0.0550
Rice Lake  Barron WI 0.0550
Green Bay  Brown WI 0.0550
Fountain City  Buffalo WI 0.0550
Chippewa Falls  Chippewa WI 0.0550
Gays Mills  Crawford WI 0.0550
Prairie Du Chien  Crawford WI 0.0550
Soldiers Grove  Crawford WI 0.0550
Madison  Dane WI 0.0550
Mc Farland  Dane WI 0.0550
Middleton  Dane WI 0.0550
Monona  Dane WI 0.0550
Sister Bay  Door WI 0.0550
Superior  Douglas WI 0.0550
Eau Claire  Eau Claire WI 0.0550
Fond Du Lac  Fond Du Lac WI 0.0500
N Fond Du Lac  Fond Du Lac WI 0.0500
Crandon  Forest WI 0.0550
Laona  Forest WI 0.0550
Bloomington  Grant WI 0.0550
Cassville  Grant WI 0.0550
Cuba City  Grant WI 0.0550
Dickeyville  Grant WI 0.0550
Hazel Green  Grant WI 0.0550
Platteville  Grant WI 0.0550
Monroe  Green WI 0.0550
Hurley  Iron WI 0.0550
Black River Falls  Jackson WI 0.0550









City  County State Sales Tax Rate
Jefferson  Jefferson WI 0.0550
Johnson Creek  Jefferson WI 0.0550
Watertown  Jefferson WI 0.0550
Mauston  Juneau WI 0.0550
New Lisbon  Juneau WI 0.0550
Kenosha  Kenosha WI 0.0550
Pleasant Prairie  Kenosha WI 0.0550
Twin Lakes  Kenosha WI 0.0550
Holmen  La Crosse WI 0.0550
West Salem  La Crosse WI 0.0550
LaCrosse  LaCrosse WI 0.0550
Gratiot  Lafayette WI 0.0550
South Wayne  Lafayette WI 0.0550
Tomahawk  Lincoln WI 0.0550
Wausau  Marathon WI 0.0550
Crivitz  Marinette WI 0.0550
Marinette  Marinette WI 0.0550
Peshtigo  Marinette WI 0.0550
Pound  Marinette WI 0.0550
Greenfield  Milwaukee WI 0.0560
Milwaukee  Milwaukee WI 0.0560
Wauwatosa  Milwaukee WI 0.0560
West Allis  Milwaukee WI 0.0560
Sparta  Monroe WI 0.0550
Tomah  Monroe WI 0.0550
Oconto  Oconto WI 0.0550
Lake Tomahawk  Oneida WI 0.0550
Monico  Oneida WI 0.0550
Pelican Lake  Oneida WI 0.0550
Rhinelander  Oneida WI 0.0550
Three Lakes  Oneida WI 0.0550
Appleton  Outagamie WI 0.0500
Dresser  Polk WI 0.0550
Osceola  Polk WI 0.0550
Osceola  Polk WI 0.0550
Saint Croix Falls  Polk WI 0.0550
St Croix Falls  Polk WI 0.0550
Stevens Point  Portage WI 0.0550
Racine  Racine WI 0.0510









City  County State Sales Tax Rate 
Viola  Richland WI 0.0550
Beloit  Rock WI 0.0550
Janesville  Rock WI 0.0550
Cecil  Shawano WI 0.0550
Shawano  Shawano WI 0.0550
Howards Grove  Sheboygan WI 0.0500
Oostburg  Sheboygan WI 0.0500
Plymouth  Sheboygan WI 0.0500
Sheboygan  Sheboygan WI 0.0500
Sheboygan Falls  Sheboygan WI 0.0500
Hudson  St. Croix WI 0.0550
Arcadia  Trempealeau WI 0.0550
Galesville  Trempealeau WI 0.0550
Independence  Trempealeau WI 0.0550
Trempealeau  Trempealeau WI 0.0550
La Farge  Vernon WI 0.0550
Ontario  Vernon WI 0.0550
Viroqua  Vernon WI 0.0550
Presque Isle  Vilas WI 0.0550
Genoa City  Walworth WI 0.0550
Pell Lake  Walworth WI 0.0550
Walworth  Walworth WI 0.0550
Sarona  Washburn WI 0.0550
Waukesha  Waukesha WI 0.0510
Coloma  Waushara WI 0.0550
Redgranite  Waushara WI 0.0550
Wautoma  Waushara WI 0.0550
Menasha  Winnebago WI 0.0500
Oshkosh  Winnebago WI 0.0500
Marshfield  Wood WI 0.0550
Wisconsin Rapids  Wood WI 0.0550
Source: Tax Rates are all taken from the respective state 
department of revenue web pages at: 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/, http://www.iowa.gov/tax, 
http://www.revenue.wi.gov, http://www.michigan.gov/treasury, 
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/ 
 
 
